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COMMENT
MILITARY RULE OF EVIDENCE 412: CAN TOO MUCH
BALANCING TIP THE SCALES OF JUSTICE?
K. Alexis Johnsont
ABSTRACT
Although the Military Rules of Evidence closely mirror the FederalRules of
Evidence, some modifications have necessarily been made to the Military
Rules for use in court-martial proceedings. This Comment addresses Rule
412, the "rape shield" statute, in particular. It discusses the heightened
constitutional issues that arise due to Military Rule of Evidence 412(c)(3)'s
"balancing test" and proposes amending the rule to more closely follow its
federal counterpart.
Despite the fact that controversy surrounds Rule 412, whether it is the
federal version of the rule or the military version, most would agree that
shielding rape victims from the line of questioning that once was allowed, at
common law, is necessary. Protectingthe interests of victims of sexual assault
is of high importance, but one must not forget that defendants also have
interests that are worth protecting. The interests of the defendants stem from
the Constitution-the right to a fair trial, the right to confront the witnesses
against him, and the right to present evidence in his defense. These interests
must all be weighed in determining whose interest is prevailing and what
evidence will either be admitted or excluded.
Two recent cases from the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed
Forces, United States v. Gaddis and United States v. Ellerbrock, discuss the
balancing that Military Rule of Evidence 412 imposes on evidence of a sexual
assault victim's prior sexual history before the accused will be allowed to
admit such evidence. Prior to any balancing taking place, however, the
proffered evidence must first meet one of the narrow exceptions provided in
Rule 412(b).
To determine whether the evidence meets one of the exceptions, the
accused must first fulflll certain procedural requirements and the evidence
must be heardat a closed hearing.After these proceduralhurdles are met, the
military judge must determine whether the evidence in fact meets an
exception, and then she must weigh that evidence against the alleged victim's
t Managing Editor, LIBERTY

UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW,

Volume 9. J.D. Candidate,

Liberty University School of Law (2015); B.A., Music and English, Texas State University San Marcos (2010).

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9:145

privacy interest under Military Rule of Evidence 412(c)(3). If the military
judge finds that the probative value of the proffered evidence outweighs the
alleged victim's privacy interest, she must then conduct another balancing
test, under MilitaryRule of Evidence 403, to determine whether this evidence
that is now deemed relevant and material is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice.Subjecting the same evidence to such scrutiny may
appear thorough and necessary, given the history of sexual assault
prosecutions; however, the potential for depriving the defendant of his
constitutional rights is high. Thus, the balancing test under Rule 412(c)(3)
should be abolished.
Eliminatingthis test will not only remove confusion within court-martial
proceedings, but will protect the defendant's constitutional rights to crossexamine witnesses against him and to present an adequate defense. The
protection to the alleged victim's privacy interest will not be diminished by
amending the rule in this way since Rule 412 evidence is still subject to
consideration under Rule 403. Protectingthe privacy of sexual assault victims
and protecting defendants' constitutional rights are both interests that must
be guarded.Subjecting the accused'sproffered evidence, however, to too much
balancing may infringe on his ability to present a defense more than the
Constitution allows.
I. INTRODUCTION

Protecting the privacy interests of victims of sexual assault is an
important endeavor in our society. It is also just as important, if not more
so, when that protection appertains to our military personnel. The
individuals who serve in our military, and put their lives on the line to
ensure that we maintain our liberty as Americans, deserve to be protected
from embarrassment and humiliation should they become a victim of
sexual misconduct.' Embarrassment and humiliation usually come in the
form of cross-examination during a criminal proceeding for charges of
sexual assault. A defense tactic used to be to introduce "evidence of the
victim's 'unchaste' character."2 Protecting victims of sexual assault from this
line of questioning in court is important; however, protecting the
constitutional rights of defendants in the military who are accused of sexual

1. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, at A2236 (2012) [hereinafter MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis].

2. Id.
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misconduct must not be overlooked in the interest of shielding the privacy
interests of victims.3
This Comment discusses Military Rule of Evidence 412(c)(3) and the
"balancing test" found therein. Part II explains the background to Federal
Rule of Evidence 412 and Military Rule of Evidence 412. It discusses the
policy concerns that prompted the passage of this particular Federal Rule of
Evidence, and the history of the rule's incorporation into military criminal
justice practice. Part III looks at how a case in civilian court balances
proffered evidence that is to be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence
412; and it analyzes three military cases that employed Military Rule of
Evidence 412. It discusses differences between the applications of Rule 412
in federal versus military courts. Part IV proposes the change that should be
made to Military Rule of Evidence 412 to better comport with constitutional
considerations in a way that still takes into account the interests of the
victim, the defendant, and society.4
II. BACKGROUND
A. Enactment of FederalRule of Evidence 412
Prior to enactment of Federal Rule of Evidence (F.R.E.) 4125 in 1978, "[i ] f
a defendant in a rape case raise[d] the defense of consent, that defendant
3. The author served as a Hospital Advocate for The Rape Crisis Center of San
Antonio, Texas for nearly two years. Protecting victims, seeing to their immediate medical
needs once a sexual assault has occurred, helping them heal from the trauma of sexual
assault, and protecting them in court from being assaulted all over again are extremely
important issues that must not be overlooked. This Comment is not meant to ignore these
concerns. Protecting explicit constitutional rights, however, remains an area of law in which
every member of our society has a vested interest. Ignoring the constitutional rights of a
single defendant can begin a rapid decent down the proverbial "slippery slope" toward a
tyrannical form of government for all American citizens.
4. For an interesting discussion on the possibility of eliminating FED. R. OF EVID. 412
altogether, see Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REv. 826, 874-75 (2013)
("We may find that we have reached the point at which, instead of a prohibition with a finite
number of exceptions, what we need is a return to basics-an approach in which judges can
consider, on a case-by-case basis, the probative value of the proffered evidence to the issue
sought to be established."). While an analysis of FED. R. OF EVID. 412 in its entirety is beyond
the scope of this Comment, Professor Capers's view on rape shield statutes as a whole raises
legitimate concerns.
5. Rule 412. Rape Cases; Relevance of Victim's Past Behavior
(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, reputation or
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[could] then offer evidence about the victim's prior sexual behavior."6 In
cases of rape prosecution, "prior sexual activity was probative of consent."7
A defendant could question the victim "about whether she had had
intercourse before, how many times, how old she was when she had
intercourse for the first time, and with how many men," even if it was a case
of rape where the victim did not know the defendant prior to the attack.'
Due to this invasive and merciless line of questioning, not only was the

opinion evidence of the past sexual behavior of an alleged victim of such rape
or assault is not admissible.
(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, in a criminal case in which a
person is accused of rape or of assault with intent to commit rape, evidence of a
victim's past sexual behavior other than reputation or opinion evidence is also
not admissible, unless such evidence other than reputation or opinion evidence
is-,
(1) admitted in accordance with subdivisions (c)(1) and (c)(2) and is
constitutionally required to be admitted; or
(2) admitted in accordance with subdivision (c) and is evidence of-,
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused, offered by
the accused upon the issue of whether the accused was or was not, with
respect to the alleged victim, the source of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the accused
upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual
behavior with respect to which rape or assault is alleged.
(c)(1) If the person accused of committing rape or assault with intent to
commit rape intends to offer under subdivision (b) evidence of specific
instances of the alleged victim's past sexual behavior, the accused shall make a
written motion to offer such evidence not later than fifteen days before the date
on which the trial in which such evidence is to be offered is scheduled to begin.
(2) The motion described in paragraph (1) shall be accompanied by a written
offer of proof....
(3) If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in paragraph
(2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer is relevant and that the
probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, such
evidence shall be admissible in the trial to the extent and order made by the
court specifies evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which
the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.
Act of Oct. 28, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-540, 92 Stat. 2046 (1978) (amended 1988, 1994, & 2011).
6. 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
7. Capers, supra note 4, at 836.
8. Id. at 837.
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defendant on trial, but the victim was placed on trial, too.9 The alleged
purpose of these questions was "to determine whether she was the type of
woman who consents, the type of woman to lie about it, and hence the type
of woman who should not be protected by the law." ° Recognizing that the
"evidentiary rules have permitted introduction of evidence about a rape
victim's prior sexual conduct,"" and that the rules treated the victim as if
she were the offender, lawmakers and victim's rights advocates began to
question the propriety and usefulness of such a rule.12 The appropriateness
of such evidence was already being questioned by several states that, in turn,
decided to update their evidentiary rules to afford some protection to rape
victims. 3 Congress sought to follow the states' lead by updating the federal
evidentiary rules. 4
Congressman James Mann acknowledged in the congressional hearing
that preceded enactment of F.R.E. 412 that the defendant was permitted
wide latitude when inquiring into a rape victim's past sexual behavior."
This behavior about which the victim would be questioned had "at best a
tenuous connection to the offense for which the defendant [was] being
tried.""6 At the same time, questions regarding a defendant's prior sexual
history were barred from admission during the trial and any pretrial

9. Id. at 835. Some even argued that it was in fact the victim who was "put on trial,"

instead of the defendant, through the use of this kind of evidence. Privacy of Rape Victims:
Hearing on H.R. 14,666 and Other Bills Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the
Comm. on the JudiciaryH.R., 94th Cong. 51 (1976) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Rep.
Harris).

10. Capers, supra note 4, at 835. At common law, promiscuity was viewed as relevant
and could be used to attack her credibility. See Shawn J. Wallach, Note, Rape Shield Laws:
Protectingthe Victim at the Expense of the Defendant's Constitutional-Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J.
HUM. RTS. 485,487 (1997).
11. 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).

12. Id.
13. Id: Michigan, the first state to enact a "rape shield" law, did so in 1974. Comment,
Rape, Sexual Assault and Evidentiary Matters, 14 GEo. J. GENDER & L. 585, 590 (Helim

Kathleen Chun & Lindsey Love, eds., 2013). Several states had already enacted rape shield
laws similar to F.R.E. 412 prior to 1978. See Hearing,supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Rep.
Hungate, Chairman, Subcomm. on Criminal Justice) ("The Justice Department reports that
some 30 States have already enacted laws similar in thrust to [F.R.E. 412]. Several other

States are reported to have such legislation pending.").
14. 124 CONG. REc. 34,912 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
15. Id.
16. Id.
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hearings.' 7 Therefore, Rule 412 was designed "to protect rape victims from
the degrading and embarrassing disclosure of intimate details about their
private lives" by admitting evidence of specific acts from the victim's sexual
history "only in clearly and narrowly defined circumstances.""
When seeking to enact the bill, Congress had to ensure that the interests
of the rape victim, the defendant, and society were all "fairly balance[dl."'9
The victim's private life needed to be protected from "unwarranted public
exposure" while at the same time still allowing the defendant to "adequately20
. . . present a defense by offering relevant and probative evidence."
Congress also wanted to protect society's interest in conducting fair trials by
not admitting "unduly prejudicial evidence" that would confuse the "issues
21
before the jury."
B. Amendments to FederalRule of Evidence 412
Since its enactment in 1978, F.R.E. 412 has undergone only a few
changes. 22 The first amendment, which occurred in 1988, merely affected

17. Capers, supra note 4, at 838.
18. 124 CONG. REc. 34,913 (1978) (statement of Rep. Mann).
19. Id.
20. Id.; see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) ("The right of crossexamination is more than a desirable rule of trial procedure. It is implicit in the
constitutional right of confrontation, and helps assure the 'accuracy of the truth-determining
process'. . . . [Tihe right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in
appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial
process.") (quoting Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
21. Id.
22. Rule 412. Sex-Offense Cases: The Victim's Sexual Behavior or Predisposition
(a) Prohibited Uses. The following evidence is not admissible in a civil or
criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct:
(1) evidence offered to prove that a victim engaged in other sexual
behavior; or
(2) evidence offered to prove a victim's sexual predisposition.
(b) Exceptions.
(1) Criminal Cases. The court may admit the following evidence in a
criminal case:
(A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior, if
offered to prove that someone other than the defendant was the
source of... physical evidence;
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terminology found within the rule.23 Prior to 1994, however, Rule 412
included a balancing test in subsection (c)(3), which read:
If the court determines on the basis of the hearing described in
paragraph (2) that the evidence which the accused seeks to offer
is relevant and that the probative value of such evidence outweighs
the danger of unfair prejudice, such evidence shall be admissible
in the trial to the extent an order made by the court specifies
evidence which may be offered and areas with respect to which
the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.24
In 1994, the rule was amended again, at which point the balancing test
found in subsection (c)(3) was eliminated.25 The use of the balancing test,
and its subsequent removal from the rule, appeared to be practically
insignificant.2 6 This seeming "insignificance" was assumed due to the fact
that the advisory committee did not provide any rationale or comment for
deleting the balancing test from the rule.27 Commentators to the rule
acknowledged that if the evidence was both narrow enough and crucial
enough to be admissible under one of the exceptions found in subsection
(b),2" then "there is little reason to filter it further through a strict
(B) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior with
respect to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by
the defendant to prove consent or if offered by the prosecutor; and
(C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's
constitutional rights.
(c) Procedure to Determine Admissibility.
(1) Motion ....
(2) Hearing ....
[(3) This paragraph was removed by the 1994 amendment. See supra note 5 for
the paragraph as originally enacted.].
FED. R. EvID. 412 (2011) (amended in 1988 & 1994).
23. Id. The purpose of the 1988 amendment was to conform terminology relating to sex
offenses. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7046, 102 Stat. 4181.
24. FED. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) (1988) (emphasis added) (amended 1994).
25. Act of Sept. 13, 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1919.

26. Shane R. Reeves, Time to Fine-Tune Military Rule of Evidence 412, 196 MIL. L. REV.
47, 79 n.180 (2008).

27. Id.; see generally FED. R. EVID. 412 advisory committee's notes.
28. FED. R. EvID. 412(b)(1) ("The court may admit the following evidence in a criminal
case: (A) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior, if offered to prove that
someone other than the defendant was the source of semen, injury, or other physical
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exclusionary balancing test."29 Although the test was eliminated from the
federal rule, Military Rule of Evidence (M.R.E.) 412 retained, and continues
to use, this balancing test.30
C. The Beginning of Military Rule of Evidence 412
Paragraph 153 b (2)(b), the precursor to M.R.E. 412, of the 1969 revised
edition of the Manual for Courts-Martial allowed "any evidence, otherwise
competent, tending to show the unchaste character of the alleged victim" in
order to prove "probability of consent by the alleged victim."3 Evidence of
this nature could be introduced at trial even if the victim had not testified. 2
This earlier rule typically discouraged victims from reporting and
prosecuting sexual assault cases within the military since it caused
embarrassment and humiliation to victims.3 In addition, the evidence
yielded under the rule usually was of minimal probative value and
potentially distracting. 4 Given the wide latitude this rule afforded
defendants, the military recognized the need for a new rule to offer victims
protection from invasive questions during investigations and courts-martial
proceedings due to the concededly "large number of sexual assault cases
common to the armed forces."3" Upon seeing the changes taking place with
the Federal Rules of Evidence as a whole, the Joint Services Committee

evidence; (B) evidence of specific instances of a victim's sexual behavior with respect to the
person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if
offered by the prosecutor; and (C) evidence whose exclusion would violate the defendant's
constitutional rights.").
29.

STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, ET AL., FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 412-1, 412-5

(10th ed. 2011).
30. See MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EvID. 412(c)(3) (2012)
[hereinafter MIL. R. EvID. 412(c)(3)]; see generally United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216
(C.A.A.F. 2004) (upholding the use of M.R.E. 412 to exclude evidence of an alleged victim's
motive to fabricate allegations); United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2011)
(holding that while M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is not facially unconstitutional, it is needlessly
confusing); United States v. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (finding error when
M.R.E. 412 was used to prevent evidence that was constitutionally required).
31. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, Para. 153 b (2)(b) (rev. ed. 1969).
32. Id.
33. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36.
34. Id.

35. Frederic I. Lederer,

The Military Rules of Evidence: Origins and Judicial

Implementation, 130 MIL. L. REv. 5, 21, 22 n.66 (1990).
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Working Group (Working Group) was formed.36 The Working Group was
tasked with drafting new rules of evidence for the military; however, the
scope of the group's task was left undefined.37 Eventually, the Working
Group was told to "adopt each Federal Rule of Evidence verbatim."3"
Although given strict orders of adoption, the Working Group was granted
latitude to change the words necessary to allow for application to military
procedure, unless a "substantial articulated military necessity for its revision
existed."39
D. IncorporatingFederalRule of Evidence 412 into Military Practice
Initially, the Working Group believed Rule 412 was unnecessary.' At the
time, evidence that a rape victim was not chaste or that she engaged in
extramarital sexual relations could be admitted in a court-martial
proceeding both to establish consent of the victim and to impeach the
victim.4" Although the Working Group recognized that such evidence was
irrelevant, 42 the belief was that Federal Rules of Evidence 4014' and 403'
made adoption of Rule 412 superfluous. 45 After one member of the
36. Id. at 9-10. One representative each from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard
and Office of the General Counsel of the Department of Defense, and two representatives
from the staff of the United States Court of Military Appeals (now the United States Court of
Appeals for the Armed Forces) comprised the Joint Services Committee Working Group. Id.
at 11. "The Marine Corps did not participate at the drafting level." Id. (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 12-13.
38. Id. at 13.
39. Id. The belief was that "military evidentiary law should be as similar to civilian law
as possible." Id. Further, it was believed not only "that the codification [of the Military Rules
of Evidence] reflect the Federal Rules of Evidence, but that all future military evidentiary law
echo it as well, unless a valid military reason existed for departing from it." Id. (emphasis in
original).
40. Id. at 21.
41. Id. at 20.
42. Id.
43. FED. R. EvID. 401 ("Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make a fact
more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and (b) the fact is of
consequence in determining the action.").
44. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.").
45. Lederer, supra note 35, at 21. "Viewed objectively and without concern for
individual bias or political implications, Rule 412 was unnecessary. Basic principles of logical
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Working Group, however, rejected the idea that Rule 412 was needless, the
Working Group chose to adopt the rule.46
Due to the unique nature of the military court system, the Working
Group needed to modify procedural aspects of F.R.E. 412 to adapt the rule
to military practice.47 In particular, the in camera hearing found in F.R.E.
412(c)(2) was substituted for a "closed hearing conducted pursuant to
Article 39(a)" of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.4" Furthermore,
unlike F.R.E. 412(c)(1), which requires a motion to be filed "at least
[fourteen] days before trial,"49 M.R.E. 412(c)(1) requires defense counsel to
"file a written motion at least five days prior to entering a plea."5 °
Although much evidence is now excluded under the new rule, "the
fundamental right of the defense under the fifth amendment of the
Constitution of the United States to present relative defense evidence" is
still recognized in subsection (b)(1).51 It was further understood that this
rule was "not to be interpreted as a rule of absolute privilege. 5 2 As
originally adopted, M.R.E. 412 omitted the civilian rule's fourteen-day
notice requirement due to the military's need for speedy trials.53
Furthermore, the rule was expanded to include other nonconsensual sexual
offenses instead of just rape.14 The rule, which is "intended to protect
human dignity and to ultimately encourage the reporting and prosecution
relevance coupled with Federal Rule of Evidence 403 should have been sufficient, and a

proposal was made not to adopt Rule 412 in favor of a more general statement of the
application of the principle of relevancy. Ms. Siemer, [Department of Defense] General
Counsel, rejected that position, and the Working Group adopted Rule 412." Id.
46. Id.
47. MIL. R.EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36.
48. Id. at A22-37; 10 U.S.C. § 839(a) (2009) ("At any time after the service of charges

which have been referred for trial to a court-martial composed of a military judge and
members, the military judge may, subject to section 835 of this title (article 35), call the court
into session without the presence of the members ....
49. FED. R. EVID.412(c)(1)(A)-(B).
50. STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG ET AL., MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 4-198, 4-206

(7th ed. 2011). "The original federal version of this provision required 15 days' notice which
the military drafters said they rejected because court-martial processing time was so much
quicker than the civilian counterpart. The same reasoning applies to the time differential in
the amended version." Id. at 4-206, n.29.
51. Id. at 4-209; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1).
52. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36.
53. Lederer, supra note 35, at 21; see supra text accompanying note 50.

54. Lederer, supra note 35, at 21; see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,
MIL. R. EVID. 412(e) (2012) [hereinafter MIL. R. EVID. 412(e)].
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of sexual offenses," could not justifiably be limited to only the offense of
rape within the military context.55 The expansion of included offenses was
designed to exclude evidence that was tangentially related to the offense at
issue but that the accused might use for its sexual connotation in an attempt
to imply a victim's unchaste character.56 Allowing evidence of innuendo
would circumvent the purpose of the rule, which is to protect the victim's
privacy.57
While the Working Group was undergoing discussions of Rule 412 for
adoption, the Working Group was tasked with redrafting the entire set of
evidentiary rules for the military.5 8 One of these other rules under
consideration by the Working Group was Rule 1102(a),59 which provides:
"Amendments to the Federal Rules of Evidence shall apply to the Military
Rules of Evidence [eighteen] months after the effective date of such
amendments, unless action to the contrary is taken by the President."6
When Congress amends the Federal Rules of Evidence, the armed forces is
given time to "review the final form of amendments and to propose any
necessary modifications to the President."61 As mentioned above, Congress
62
eliminated the balancing test from the federal criminal evidentiary rule;
however, the Working Group chose to keep the balancing test in the
military version of the Rule since "[t]here seem[ed] to be no good reason to
delete it."63
One reason given for retaining the balancing test in the military version
of Rule 412 was to guarantee that military judges would continue to balance
the interests of both the victim and the accused.' In 2007, M.R.E. 412 was
amended to assist practitioners in the application of the balancing test in
subdivision (c)(3).65 The amendment explained that "the evidence must be
relevant for one of the purposes highlighted in subdivision (b)"; the
probative value must outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice to the victim
55. SALTZBURG, supra note 50, at 4-210.
56. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36.

57. Id.
58. Lederer, supra note 35, at 12.
59.

MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EVID. 1102(a) (2012).

60. Id.
61. SALTZBURG,supra note 50, at 11-9.
62. See supra Part II.B.
63. Reeves, supra note 26, at 64 n.102.
64. Id.
65. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-37.
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and her privacy; and, although the evidence may be admissible under Rule
412, Rule 403 may still bar its admission.66 In United States v. Gaddis67 and
United States v. Ellerbrock," the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces
analyzed Rule 412 under the application set forth in the Manualfor CourtsMartial analysis to reach its decision in both of these cases.69 In these two
decisions, the court expressed its concern that the balancing test found in
M.R.E. 412(c)(3) may infringe upon a defendant's constitutional rights.7"
Although the court did not declare the balancing test facially
unconstitutional, it did leave the matter open for discussion.7 '
III. BALANCING INTERESTS IN CIVILIAN AND MILITARY COURTS
A. FederalRule of Evidence 412 in Civilian Court: United States v.
Anderson
1. Facts
In United States v. Anderson,72 Anderson was indicted for certain sexual
acts concerning S.M., the alleged victim, that occurred in September 2008."
Raising a defense of consent, Anderson sought to enter evidence of prior
sexual encounters with the alleged victim."4 He claimed that he and S.M.
had over a ten-year history of sexual activity prior to the acts at issue in the
criminal proceeding.7" Two specific pieces of evidence Anderson sought to
introduce were: instances of prior sexual activity that occurred at the home
of S.M. in 2007 and "evidence of weekly sexual encounters with S.M. in
2003 and 2004 that occurred" in various rooms at the defendant's and

66. Id.; see MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EvID. 403 (2012)
[hereinafter MIL. R. EVID. 403] ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice .....
67. United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
68. United States v. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
69. See Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 251-57; Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 317-21; see MIL. R. EVID. 412
analysis, supra note 1,at A22-37.
70. See cases cited supra notes 67 and 68.
71. See cases cited supra notes 67 and 68.
72. United States v. Anderson, 467 F. App'x 474 (6th Cir. 2012).
73. Id. at 476.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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victim's place of employment. 6 The government conceded that evidence
regarding Anderson's prior sexual history with S.M. could be admitted in
order to demonstrate consent; however, the government claimed that the
defendant did not provide sufficient "specific instances of sexual behavior
by the alleged victim as required by [Federal Rule of Evidence]
412(b)(1)(B)" when he alleged that the acts occurred "in various rooms" at
their place of employment. 77 Under Rule 403,78 "[t]he government further
argued that the probative value of any previous sexual contact between [the
defendant] and S.M. was outweighed by unfair prejudice."7 ' Based on these
facts, the district court held that both types of evidence were inadmissible."0
2.

The District Court's Rationale for Excluding the Proffered Evidence

At the final pretrial conference, the district court excluded the'evidence
regarding Anderson's 2007 encounter with the alleged victim that occurred
at her home.' The district court found that restricting the evidence to
similar acts that occurred in close proximity and time to the same venue
was important.8 2 The court thought that the alleged acts from 2007 that took
place in a private setting-the victim's home-were distinguishable from
the indicted offenses, which took place in a public setting-at their place of
employment.8 3 Therefore, the court barred admission of the evidence
4
regarding the 2007 acts.
After the in camera hearing, as required under Rule 412(c)(2), the district
court found that the alleged acts from 2003 and 2004 were not relevant for
several reasons."' The court found that the lapse in time from the previous
acts to the current allegations was significant, and that Anderson's
testimony was "a good deal less than completely credible. 81 6 Furthermore,

76. Id. at 478.

77. Id. at 476 (internal quotation marks omitted).
78. FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is
").
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice ....
79. Anderson, 467 F. App'x at 476.
80. Id.

81. Id.
82. Id. at 478.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 476.
85. Id.at 478.
86. Id. The court quoted the following from the trial court's ruling: "I find that the
defendant's testimony is a good deal less than completely credible in terms of where and why
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the activities alleged were "inadequately specific," and the defendant did not
show a pattern sufficient to establish the claim of consent that would cause
the defendant to be deprived of any constitutional right, and more
specifically, any deprivation of rights under the Sixth Amendment.87 The
only statement the court made about balancing the probative value of the
evidence against its unfair prejudice was: "I think that they do not have the
necessary probative value to outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice.... .""
The district court did not elaborate on the facts it weighed when making
this assessment, but still came to this conclusion. 9 After his conviction, the
defendant appealed the district court's decision to exclude the proffered
evidence.9"
3. The Appellate Court's Rationale
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in reviewing the district court's
decision to exclude the defendant's two pieces of evidence,9' weighed the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial effect to the alleged
victim.92 As to the incidents that occurred at the home of S.M., the appellate
court addressed the issue of a public versus a private venue-an issue on
which the district court placed significant weight.93 Much like the district
court, the appellate court also acknowledged that there exists a difference
between sexual acts that take place in a private locale versus acts done in
public, but said that this difference "does not eliminate, or even
substantially reduce, the probative value of such acts in this case."94 It

these encounters allegedly occurred, and they are inadequately specific to meet the
requirements of the rule." Id.
87. Id. at 478-79.
88. Id. at 478. Although the trial court gave no specific facts, it considered the
prejudicial impact that the evidence would have to the privacy interests of S.M., the alleged
victim. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 478-49.
90. Id. at 475.
91. Id. at 478. "Anderson sought to introduce two types of evidence: 1) three instances
of prior sexual activity with S.M. in 2007 that occurred in her garage and house... ; and 2)
evidence of weekly sexual encounters with S.M. in 2003 and 2004 that occurred at the
Medicine Lodge.... Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 479.
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further stated that the probative value of the evidence outweighed the
"prejudicial impact" of the defendant's testimony. 5
Next, the court considered the evidence proffered by the defendant from
the 2003 and 2004 acts that occurred at the victim's workplace.96 The court
again performed a balancing test to determine whether the lower court
should have admitted the evidence. 7 Specifically, it said that the probative
value of the defendant's testimony about the acts that occurred at the
workplace would substantially outweigh its prejudicial effect since the
evidence, if believed by the fact-finder, would "help explain the otherwise
incredulous act of [the defendant] initiating sexual contact with S.M. in her
office... .""Although the court only explicitly references F.R.E. 403 once,99
it is clear from the opinion that the court weighed the probative value of the
evidence against the prejudicial impact of the same evidence."° Since
subsection (c)(3) was amended out of F.R.E. 412 by this time, the court
could not employ its use, and was therefore required to balance the
evidence solely under F.R.E. 403.101 After conducting this balancing test
with both types of evidence, and analyzing the specific issues found within
each type of evidence, the appellate court found that the lower court abused
its discretion when it excluded the evidence. 1 2 The appellate court vacated
the defendant's conviction as to attempted aggravated sexual abuse of S.M
03
and remanded the case for a new trial.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 479-80.
97. Id. at 480.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 478.
100. Id. at 479-80; see FED. R. EVID. 403 ("The court may exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following:
unfair prejudice ....).
101. See supra text accompanying note 5. Subsection (c)(3) was amended out of F.R.E.
412 in 1994. See supra Part II.B. United States v. Anderson was decided in 2012. The lower
and appellate courts' use of F.R.E. 403 to decide the admissibility of the proffered evidence
shows that F.R.E. 403 is sufficient for balancing the probative value of the evidence against
any unfair prejudice, whether such unfair prejudice may be to the victim or the prosecution.
See Anderson, 467 Fed. App'x at 477-79.
102. Anderson, 467 F. App'x at 480.
103. Id. at 482.
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B. Military Rule of Evidence 412 in Courts-Martial
1. United States v. Banker
a.

Facts

In United States v. Banker,' Banker initiated and perpetuated a sexual
relationship with L.G., his son's fourteen-year-old babysitter.' 5 Banker
moved during trial to introduce evidence of alleged sexual behavior by L.G.
with Banker's son, who was nine years old when L.G. began babysitting for
the family.0 6 Banker sought to offer the evidence pursuant to M.R.E.
412(b)(1)(C).' °7 Banker claimed that L.G. had a motive to fabricate the
allegations against him and that exclusion of his son's testimony regarding
L.G.'s behavior would violate Banker's constitutional rights.'
After
conducting a closed hearing where both L.G. and Banker's son testified,'0 9
the military judge found that the evidence was not relevant and, therefore,
excluded the evidence." 0
b. The lower court's rationale
To determine whether the evidence offered by Banker could be admitted
at trial, the military judge conducted a closed hearing pursuant to M.R.E.
412(c)(2)."' During the closed hearing, Banker's son testified about the
allegations of sexual behavior by L.G. in order to prove L.G.'s motive to

104. United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
105. Id. at 218.
106. Id.

107. Id.; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) ("In a proceeding, the following evidence is
admissible, if otherwise admissible under these rules: ... evidence the exclusion of which
would violate the constitutional rights of the accused.").
108. Banker, 60 M.J. at 218.
109. Id.; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(2) ("Before admitting evidence under this rule, the
military judge must conduct a hearing, which shall be closed. At this hearing, the parties may
call witnesses, including the alleged victim, and offer relevant evidence. The alleged victim
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to attend and be heard.").
110. Banker, 60 M.J. at 218.
111. Id.; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(2) ("Before admitting evidence under this rule, the
military judge must conduct a hearing, which shall be closed.... In a case before a courtmartial composed of a military judge and members, the military judge shall conduct the
hearing outside the presence of the members pursuant to Article 39(a). The motion, related
papers, and the record of the hearing must be sealed and remain under seal unless the court
orders otherwise.").
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fabricate the allegations against Banker." 2 Banker's son, however, did not
make allegations against L.G. until eight months after L.G. reported
Banker's sexual misconduct to the Air Force Office of Special
Investigations." 3 Moreover, the defendant's "argument did not sufficiently
articulate how the testimony [of the defendant's son] reasonably established
a motive to fabricate."" 4 The military judge subsequently found that the
evidence was not relevant and excluded it from admission at trial.I s
c.

The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces compares M.R.E.
412(c)(3) and 403

The appellate court began its analysis by discussing the purpose of
M.R.E. 412 and its relation to F.R.E. 412.6 The court then described the
analysis that military judges use to determine whether evidence proffered
under the third exception to M.R.E. 412 should be admitted."7 "Under
M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C), the accused has the right to present evidence that is
relevant, material, and favorable to his defense.""' The military judge must
first find that the evidence is relevant pursuant to M.R.E. 401."9 If the
proffered evidence is relevant, then the military judge determines whether it
is material. 2 This determination is made by "look[ing] at the importance of
the issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in
this case; the extent to which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of the
other evidence in the case pertaining to this issue."' 2' Once she determines

112. Banker, 60 M.J. at 218.
113. Id.at221.
114. Id. at 225.
115. Id. at218.
116. Id. at 221. Both the federal rule and its military counterpart have the same policy
reasons for their enactment, which is to protect a sexual assault victim's privacy. See generally
Hearing,supra note 9 (testimony from several individuals discussing the need for a rule of
evidence prohibiting a certain line of questioning from the defense); 124 CONG. REC. 11,944
(1978) (discussing same); Lederer, supra note 35, at 20-21.
117. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) and infra text accompanying
note 218.
118. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
119. Id.; MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EVID. 401 (2012)
[hereinafter MIL. R. EVID. 401] ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
120. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222.
121. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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that the evidence is relevant and material, the military judge then applies
the balancing test under M.R.E. 412(c)(3). 22 The court stated that the
purpose of balancing the evidence under M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is to determine
"whether the evidence is favorable to the accused's defense." 123 It then
discussed the differences between the balancing tests found in M.R.E.
412(c)(3) and M.R.E. 403.124
The court explained that M.R.E. 403 is a rule of inclusion while M.R.E.
412(c)(3) is a rule of exclusion. 125 Under M.R.E. 403, the opponent must
12 6
show why the evidence is inadmissible since its admissibility is presumed.
Under M.R.E. 412(c)(3), however, "the proponent of the evidence [must]
demonstrate why the [proffered] evidence is admissible."1 27 Moreover,

M.R.E. 403 generally applies to both parties to the criminal case, whereas
M.R.E. 412(c)(3) applies only to the accused. 2 Although the court
emphasized that the prejudice in question in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is that of the
alleged victim, it accepted that the factors found in M.R.E. 403 are to be
considered when weighing the proffered evidence under M.R.E.
412(c)(3).'29 Additionally, M.R.E. 403 is concerned with the prejudice that

122. Id.; MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) ("If the military judge determines on the basis of the

hearing described in paragraph (2) of this subsection that the evidence that the accused seeks
to offer is relevant for a purpose under subsection (b) and that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the dangerof unfairprejudice...." (emphasis added)).
123. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222. The court acknowledged that "favorable"

is not a word

conducive to a specific definition, but found the word "vital" to be synonymous based on
Supreme Court precedent and other rulings of the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in
this area. Id.
124. Id. at 222-23.
125.

Id. at 223.

126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. The court notes that M.R.E. 412(a), however, applies to both the government and

the accused. Id. "Evidence generally inadmissible.The following evidence is not admissible in

any proceeding involving an alleged sexual offense except as provided in subdivisions (b)
and (c): (1) Evidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual
behavior. (2) Evidence offered to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition." MANUAL
FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EVID. 412(a) (2012) [hereinafter MIL. R. EVID.
412(a)].
129. Banker, 60 M.J. at 223. In its later opinion, United States v. Gaddis, the Court of

Appeals for the Armed Forces recognized that it "erroneous[ly] assum[ed] that 'unfair
prejudice' in the context of former M.R.E. 412(c)(3) meant something different than 'unfair
prejudice' as the term is generally used under the rules of evidence." United States v. Gaddis,
70 M.J. 248, 254 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
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could affect those who are parties to the case-the government and the
accused. 30 The court pointed out that "M.R.E. 412 does not wholly supplant
M.R.E. 403 since the military judge may exclude evidence on M.R.E. 403
grounds even if that evidence would otherwise be admissible under M.R.E.
412."131

Upon being asked by the military judge why the testimony of Banker's
son should be admitted, defense counsel's only theory was that it went to
the credibility of L.G. and her motive to fabricate. 32 "The question
remained whether [Banker's] proffer was adequate to show support for his
theory."3 3 Since the military judge found that the evidence was not relevant,
it was unnecessary for the judge to then "address the constitutional
exception or the application of the balancing test."'34 The appellate court
concluded that, without more from defense counsel showing why the
evidence was relevant, the military judge did not abuse his discretion when
he ruled to exclude the testimony of Banker's son.33 Banker "did not meet
his burden of proving why the M.R.E. 412 prohibition should be lifted. 136
2.

United States v. Gaddis
a.

Facts

In United States v. Gaddis,'37 Gaddis was convicted of various acts of
sexual misconduct with his stepdaughter, T.E. 38 T.E. first complained about
the acts done by Gaddis when she learned that her mother was taking her to
the doctor for a physical. 9 This medical examination was a requirement for
T.E. to try out for her school's cheerleading squad. 4 ' T.E. disclosed Gaddis's
sexual misconduct to a friend because she believed the examination "would

130. Banker, 60 M.J. at 223. Courts-martial do not hear civil cases; "[tihey are convened
to adjudicate charges of criminal violations of military law." Parisi v. Davidson, 405 U.S. 34,
42 (1972).
131. Banker, 60 M.J. at 223 n.3.
132. Id. at 224.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 225.
135. Id.
136. Id.

137. United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
138. Id. at 251.

139. Id.
140. Id.
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show that she had been raped by [Gaddis]." 14' At trial, defense counsel

sought to introduce evidence to prove that T.E. had a motive to fabricate
the allegations against Gaddis. 142 The defense's theory was "based on reports
and e-mails implying that [T.E.] was sexually active."' 43
Defense counsel alleged that T.E. "expressed concern.., that the physical
would reveal if [she] was sexually active."'" Further, defense counsel alleged
that T.E. believed that her mother wanted her to have the examination
"after seeing an email containing a rumor that T.E. was sexually active." 4
'
The government argued that the evidence was inadmissible since "evidence
of a victim's prior sexual conduct" is excluded under M.R.E. 412.146 The
defense argued that the evidence was constitutionally required because the
defendant has a right to put on a defense, which includes the right "to crossexamine and confront witnesses [against him] if they have ... motive to
misrepresent."' 47 The evidence was being offered, defense counsel further
argued, not for the truth about T.E. and her alleged consensual sexual
activity, but "to impeach [her] credibility." 4 s The government, however,
argued that defense counsel must "show that some sexual activity occurred"
149
in order for T.E. to have a motive to fabricate.
b. The lower court allows the 'evidence with limits
The lower court allowed the evidence for impeachment purposes, but
placed limits upon defense counsel's use of the evidence. 50 Included in
these limits were: the prohibition on referring to the "prior sexual activity of
the victim"; the rumors contained in the emails of prior sexual activity; and
a description of the emails as "relating to sexual activity.""5 ' The military
judge, however, allowed the parties to "argue permissible inferences from

141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.; MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) ("[S]uch evidence shall be admissible under this rule to
the extent an order made by the military judge specifies evidence that may be offered and
areas with respect to which the alleged victim may be examined or cross-examined.").
151.

Gaddis,70 MJ. at 251.
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this evidence."" 2 After his conviction, Gaddis appealed, "argu[ing] that this
ruling deprived him of his opportunity to present a meaningful defense"
and that M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is facially unconstitutional "because it permits a
military judge to exclude evidence that is otherwise constitutionally
required."' 53
c.

The appellate court reviews the limitations placed on the
evidence

The appellate court affirmed the lower court's ruling that limited the use
of defense counsel's evidence. 4 It held that "a reasonable panel would not
have received a significantly different impression of [the victim]'s credibility
had [Gaddis] been permitted to cross-examine her regarding the substance
of the e-mails, which only contained unsubstantiated rumors of sexual
activity." 5 In addressing Gaddis's argument that M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is
facially unconstitutional, the court "decline[d] to adopt such an
interpretation" because "M.R.E. 412 cannot limit the introduction of
evidence that is required to be admitted by the Constitution."5 6 The court
explained that, although the test is not unconstitutional on its face, it would
be unconstitutional as applied under circumstances in which evidence is
excluded by a military judge because the "probative value did not outweigh
the danger of unfair prejudice to the alleged victim's privacy" and the
exclusion "would violate the constitutional rights of the accused."5 7
In United States v. Banker,"" the court, for the first time, held that the
legitimate privacy interests of the victim "was part of the constitutional
analysis" under the old M.R.E. 412.159 The Gaddis court acknowledged that

152. Id.

153. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
154. Id. at 257.

155. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. Id. at 253.
157. Id.
158. United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
159. Gaddis,70 M.J. at 254; see Banker, 60 M.J. at 223. M.R.E. 412(c)(3) was amended in
2007 in response to the holding in Banker. Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 254 n.1. The Gaddis court
thought that "this problematic change was entirely unnecessary." Id. It thought that the test
prior to the 2007 amendment was "eminently workable and suffered from no risk of
violating either the Constitution or M.R.E. 412 itself' because military judges have "wide
latitude to determine the admissibility of evidence." Id. "Applied to the prior version of
M.R.E. 412, this latitude encompassed the requirement that the proponent of the evidence
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this analysis was based on the court's "erroneous assumption that 'unfair
prejudice' in the context of former M.R.E. 412(c)(3) meant something
different than 'unfair prejudice' as the term is generally used under the rules
of evidence." 160 It further stated that Banker's suggestion that "balancing
constitutionally required evidence against the privacy interest of the victim
before admitting it is necessary to further the purpose of the rule" is "simply
wrong."' 6 ' Evidence of an alleged victim's sexual behavior or predisposition
is inadmissible under M.R.E. 412 unless it is constitutionally required. 162 "At
best the balancing test under M.R.E. 412(c)(3), as currently written, is a
nullity with respect to the constitutionally required exception set out in
163
"1....
M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C)
Furthermore, the court explained that a defendant's right to present a
defense is not violated by M.R.E. 412 "unless [it is] arbitrary or
disproportionate to the purposes [it is] designed to serve." 164 It held that the
balancing test in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is not unconstitutional on its face because
the "test is neither arbitrary nor disproportionate to [the] purpose" of
protecting "victims of sexual assaults from the often embarrassing and
degrading cross-examination and evidence presentations common to
prosecutions of such offenses." 16 Although the court held that the rule's
balancing test is not facially unconstitutional, it did acknowledge that the
structure of the rule is confusing and "the test has the potential to lead
military judges to exclude constitutionally required evidence." 66 The court,
demonstrate that the probative value of the evidence outweigh the factors militating against
its admission." Id.
160. Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 254; see, e.g., MIL. R. EvID. 403; see also supra note 129 and

accompanying text.
161. Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 256.

162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 253 (quoting United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
165. Id. at 253-54 (quoting MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, at A22-35 (2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
166. Id. at 254. The appellate court also noted that M.R.E. 412(c)(3) was amended in 2007
to include the language "alleged victim's privacy" for unfair prejudice due to the decision in

United States v. Banker. Id. at 254 n.2. Prior to this change, the rule simply provided that
evidence would be admissible if the "probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger
of unfair prejudice" without limiting or specifying that only a victim's privacy was to be
considered. Id. at 245 n. 1. The court explained that as "applied to the prior version of M.R.E.
412, [the wide] latitude" military judges have to determine admissibility of evidence
.encompassed the requirement that the proponent of the evidence demonstrate that the
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was not constitutionally
however, found that the evidence offered by Gaddis
1 67
required and affirmed the lower court's decision.
3.

United States v. Ellerbrock
a.

Facts

In United States v. Ellerbrock,16' Ellerbrock attempted to introduce
evidence of a prior extramarital affair of the alleged victim, C.L., to prove
69
her motive to lie about the sexual ejicounter at issue in the case at bar.
Shortly after the deployrpent of C.L.'s husband, Ellerbrock visited C.L.'s
home with three other friends. 70 C.L. testified that she had been drinking
and had taken sedatives that evening. 7' Eventually, the three friends left
Ellerbrock and C.L. alone in the house.'72 When the three friends later
reentered the home, they discovered Ellerbrock engaging in sexual
intercourse with C.0 7 At trial, each of the three friends testified; however,
their stories were in conflict regarding whether C.L. was alert or
unconscious when the friends found Ellerbrock and C.L. in the bedroom.'74
Whether C.L. consented at the time of the encounter, or whether she was
even capable of giving consent, depended on whether C.L. was conscious at
that time. 75
At trial the defense introduced evidence that, at the time of trial, C.L. and
her husband had been married for three years. 76 Defense counsel also
established that one of the witnesses of the alleged rape, Specialist Jackson,

probative value of the evidence outweigh the factors militating against its admission .... That
test was eminently workable and suffered from no risk of violating either the Constitution or
M.R.E. 412 itself." Id.
167. Id. at 257.
168. United States v. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
169. Id. at 317.
170. Id. at 316.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 316-17. Further, the record states that "[wihen [C.L.] finally spoke with" one of
the friends who witnessed Ellerbrock and C.L. in the bedroom and who later testified at trial
"the next morning, she said that she remembered having sex with [Ellerbrock] and said
something to the effect of, 'I can't believe I did that' and 'I feel horrible."' Id. at 317.
176. Id. at 327 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
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was a good friend of C.L.'s husband. 17 7 C.L.'s use of Xanax and alcohol on
the night of the encounter with Ellerbrock was also established by the
defense.178 Furthermore, C.L.'s court-martial testimony differed from the
sworn statement she initially gave to investigators regarding the alleged
sexual assault.'79 Under M.R.E. 412, Ellerbrock sought to introduce evidence
of a prior affair engaged in by C.L. in order "to support his theory that [the
nature of the sex
alleged victim] had a motive to lie about the consensual
°
180
marriage.
her
protect
to
was
which
with him,
b. The lower court excludes evidence of an earlier affair
In ruling on the motion, the military judge found that the evidence of the
extramarital affair was "marginally relevant" to show a motive to lie, and
that the evidence of the affair was stale.'' It occurred about two and a half
years prior to the encounter at issue in the case at bar. 8 2 "[T]he military
judge concluded that the probative value of the evidence did not outweigh
its dangers to [the alleged victim]'s privacy interests" and "under M.R.E.
403, the dangers of unfair prejudice-waste of time and confusion of the
83
issues-substantially outweighed the probative value of this evidence.'1
Therefore, since the military judge determined that the evidence "was not
constitutionally required,"8 4 she ruled to exclude the evidence of C.L.'s
previous affair from the trial. 8 1 On appeal to the Army Court of Criminal
Appeals, the lower appellate court held "that the military judge did not
abuse her discretion in excluding the evidence.'18 Additionally, it found
that even if the exclusion by the military judge was an error, "any error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because defense counsel ... argue[d]

177. Id.
178. Id.

179. Id. "[T]he defense established that [C.L.]'s initial sworn statement to investigators
differed from her court-martial testimony in that she had not told investigators that
Appellant had anal sex with her in the middle of the night and that she had told him to stop."
Id. "The defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine [C.L.] on the numerous selfevident bases for her motive to fabricate and to argue the same to the members." Id.
180. Id. at 317 (majority opinion).
181.

Id.

182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id.
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that [C.L.] had a motive to fabricate about [consent] . . . even without

evidence of the prior affair."" 7
c. The appellate court reverses the decision
In reviewing the lower court's decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces explained that evidence that is to be admitted under M.R.E.
412(b)(1)(C)8' must be admitted "when the evidence is relevant, material,
and the probative value of the evidence outweighs the dangers of unfair
prejudice."" 9 The court concluded that the evidence of the prior affair was
relevant because C.L.'s fear of her husband divorcing her for engaging in
another extramarital relationship gave her a motive to lie about the
consensual nature of the act with Ellerbrock 9 ° It also concluded that the
evidence was material because "the existence of a prior affair may have
established a greater motive for [C.L.] to lie about whether her sexual
encounter with [Ellerbrock] was consensual." 9 '
The court next addressed the probative value of the evidence as weighed
against its unfair prejudice. 92 Notably, the court did not address the privacy
interests of the alleged victim when it discussed the unfair prejudice of the
evidence.' The court, however, noted that there was "no dispute as to
whether the affair occurred."' 94 It found the probative value of the evidence
to be high since the testimony of the other witnesses was conflicting and
"the credibility of [the alleged victim]'s testimony about whether she
consented was crucial to [Ellerbrock's] conviction."' 95

187. Id.; see supra Part III.D.
188. MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) provides that evidence otherwise inadmissible under
M.R.E. 412(a) is admissible if it is "evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the accused."
189. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318.
190. Id. at319.
191. Id. at 320.
192. Id. "[T]he probative weight of the evidence must outweigh the privacy interests of
the victim." Id. at 323 (Baker, J., dissenting). If the probative value is "sufficiently high," the
"probative weight will necessarily outweigh any privacy interest of the victim." Id. "Such
evidence ...

is

..

. 'vital' to the accused, and is constitutionally required because the accused

has a right to a fair trial and an opportunity to put on a defense." Id.
193. Id. at 326; see MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) ("[Aind that the probative value of such
evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the alleged victim's privacy.

(emphasis added)).
194. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 320 (majority opinion).

195. Id.
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In his dissent, Judge Baker noted that the theory of admissibility
presented by the defense "rested on just the sort of presumption M.R.E. 412
is intended to address."'96 The defense sought to introduce the evidence to
show that it was more likely that C.L. would have lied since she had engaged
in a previous affair.'97 Judge Baker acknowledged that, without regard to
whether a spouse engaged in a previous affair, the "spouse might have a
motive to hide a consensual sexual encounter outside the marriage."' In
light of the evidence presented by the defense, however, Judge Baker
explained that it does not necessarily follow that a past affair alone would
"make[] it any more likely the offending spouse" would lie about a
subsequent consensual extramarital sexual encounter.'99 According to Judge
Baker, the military judge understood the "broader implications of her
ruling" as it would affect subsequent interpretations and applications of
M.R.E. 412.200 If the military judge admitted the evidence at issue in this
case, a spouse's entire sexual history during the marriage would be subject
to disclosure in a court-martial proceeding as relevant to show bias in
subsequent cases where a spouse alleges rape.2 '
C. BalancingFederaland Military Cases
In United States v. Anderson, °2 the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals used
F.R.E. 403 to weigh the probative value of the proffered evidence against
any unfair prejudice-potentially unfair prejudice to the defendant, to
society, and to the victim's privacy interests, along with the policy reasons
for enacting F.R.E. 412.203 Although the appellate court determined that the
lower court should have admitted evidence of prior sexual acts of the

196. Id. at 321 (Baker, J., dissenting).
197. Id.

198. Id. at 325-26.
199. Id. at 326. "One could even argue based on the facts in this case that it made it less
likely because [C.L.] reported the [previous] affair herself." Id. "Evidence of [C.L.]'s prior
affair would have added little or nothing to this motive" to lie. Id. at 327-28 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). "Additional cross-examination on this topic would not have established a
potential motive to lie but merely would have embellished facts already showing that
motive." Id. at 328 (quoting United States v. Nelson, 39 F.3d 705, 709 (7th Cir. 1994))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
200. Id. at 326 (Baker, J., dissenting).
201. Id.

202. United States v. Anderson, 467 Fed. App'x 474 (6th Cir. 2012).
203. See id. at 479-80.
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alleged victim with the defendant under F.R.E. 412(b)(1)(B), the appellate
court did not discuss the need to sift the proffered evidence through an
additional balancing test. °4 It acknowledged that the evidence might have
been prejudicial to the alleged victim; however, the prejudice to the alleged
victim was not enough to outweigh the probative value of the evidence. 0 5
20 6
The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, in United States v. Banker,
specifically held that the privacy interests of the alleged victim must be a
consideration when weighing unfair prejudice of proffered evidence against
its probative value. 2 7 The court discussed the use of the language "the
accused seeks to offer" found in M.R.E. 412(c)(3). ° It stated that "[i]t
would be illogical if the judge were to evaluate evidence 'offered by the
accused' for unfair prejudice to the accused. Rather, in the context of this
rape shield statute, the prejudice in question is, in part, that to the privacy
20 9
interests of the alleged victim."
United States v. Gaddis21 ° and United States v. Ellerbrock21 1 call into

question the soundness of the court's ruling in Banker.212 In these
subsequent decisions, the court concedes that the balancing test in M.R.E.
412(c)(3) is not facially unconstitutional, but in Gaddis, the court implied
that the rule should be redrafted to be simpler to apply, or even simpler to
2 13

understand.

IV. PROPOSAL
M.R.E. 412(c)(3) should be amended to exclude the balancing test-as
was done with F.R.E. 412(c)(3)-and M.R.E. 403 should be used to balance
the interests at stake. Although the balancing test in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) may
not be facially unconstitutional, its potential to cause a military judge to
exclude evidence that would otherwise be admissible and to prevent the

204.
205.
206.
207.

See id. at 474; see also supra Part III.A.
Anderson, 467 Fed. App'x at 480.
United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
Id. at 223.

208. MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3) ("If the military judge determines ... that the evidence that
the accused seeks to offer is relevant .... (emphasis added)).
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Banker, 60 M.J. at 223.
United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
United States v. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. 314 (C.A.A.F. 2011).
Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 250; Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 315, n.1.
Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 253.
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defendant from presenting a complete defense is too great.2 14 Additionally,
while the privacy interests of victims of sexual assault are extremely
important, such interests do not have greater weight than a defendant's
right to a constitutionally proper trial.21 The privacy interest of victims is
an interest that is, and should be, readily protected by the government in
sexual assault cases. Instead of conducting two balancing tests-one under
M.R.E. 412(c)(3) to determine if evidence should be admitted and the
second under M.R.E. 403 to determine whether this evidence should remain
excluded-only one balancing test, under M.R.E. 403, is necessary to
protect a victim's privacy interests. Moreover, amending the rule would
prevent cases from being reversed and remanded due to misuse of a
confusing aspect of the rule.
The risk that M.R.E. 412(c)(3) could cause a military judge to exclude
evidence that is otherwise admissible places too heavy a burden on a
defendant when the defendant's liberty is at stake. The Gaddis court
contends that the language "to the alleged victim's privacy" in M.R.E.
412(c)(3), which was added with the 2007 amendment, makes the rule both
difficult to understand and to apply for military judges.216 The court states
that the "confusing structure" of the rule "has the potential to lead military
judges to exclude constitutionally required evidence merely because its
probative value does not outweigh the danger of prejudice to the alleged
victim's privacy."217 After all, M.R.E. 412 is a rule of exclusion. 21 8 The

defendant is required to show that the proffered evidence, if offered under
the constitutionally required exception,1 9 is relevant, material, and
favorable to his defense.22 ° If the military judge finds that the proffered

214. See id. at 254; see also Part III.B.2.
215. See Wallach, supra note 10, at 521 ("Rape shield laws are necessary to protect a
victim of a sex crime from being victimized in court. However, this in no way means that a
defendant, who sits in the courtroom, presumed innocent, should have his constitutional
rights diminished."); see also J. Alexander Tanford & Anthony J. Bocchino, Rape Victim
Shield Laws and the Sixth Amendment, 128 U. PENN. L. REv. 544, 554-55 (1980) ("Criminal
defendants have been guaranteed numerous rights by the fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendments, and states may not infringe upon them regardless of general legislative

power.").
216. Gaddis,70 M.J. at 253.

217. Id. at 254.
218. United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
219. See MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C).

220. See supra Part III.B.l.c (discussing how the court determined whether evidence was
relevant, material, and favorable to the defendant's defense, and the factors the court
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evidence is relevant and material, she determines whether it is favorable to
the defense by weighing it under M.R.E. 412(c)(3).22' Such evidence is
inadmissible, however, if the defendant can show that the evidence is
relevant and material, but cannot show that the probative value of the
proffered evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice.222
When balancing the probative value of the proffered evidence against the
danger of unfair prejudice under M.R.E. 412(c)(3), military courts are to
utilize the factors found in M.R.E. 403.223 Those factors are: "unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the members, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence. ''224 The military judge is to weigh the proffered
evidence under M.R.E. 412, using the M.R.E. 403 factors, to determine
considered); see also Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (quoting United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1, 5
(C.M.A. 1983)) and Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318-19. "After determining whether the evidence
offered by the accused is relevant and material, the judge employs the M.R.E. 412 balancing
test in determining whether the evidence is favorable to the accused's defense." Banker, 60
M.J. at 222. Although "[tlhe accused has a right to put on testimony relevant to his theory of
defense," such a right is not without limits. Id. Even if the evidence is relevant under M.R.E.
401, it must be found material, under a multi-factor test, and favorable. Id. The factors the
judge considers to determine whether relevant evidence is material are "the importance of
the issue for which the evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in this case; the
extent to which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of the other evidence in the case
pertaining to this issue." Id. (quoting United States v. Colon-Angueira, 16 M.J. 20, 26
(C.M.A. 1983)). To then require a balancing test to determine whether the evidence should
be admitted would serve no problem if the inquiry were to end there. Under M.R.E.
412(c)(3), the evidence would still be considered excluded unless the accused can show "that
the probative value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice to the alleged
victim's privacy .... MIL. R. EvID. 412(c)(3). The analysis, however, does not end there.
Banker, 60 M.J. at 223 n.3. If the military judge determines that the evidence is admissible
under M.R.E. 412, the judge may still end up excluding the evidence if she determines under
M.R.E. 403 that "[a]lthough relevant" the "probative value [of the evidence] is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." MIL. R. EVID. 403; see Banker, 60 M.J. at 223
n.3.

221. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 ("After determining whether the evidence offered by the
accused is relevant and material, the judge employs the M.R.E. 412 balancing test in
determining whether the evidence is favorable to the accused's defense.").
222. Id. at 222-23; see MIL. R. EvID. 412(c)(3) ("If the military judge determines on the
basis of the hearing described in paragraph (2) of this subsection that the evidence that the
accused seeks to offer is relevant for a purpose under subsection (b) and that the probative
value of such evidence outweighs the danger of unfairprejudice to the alleged victim's privacy,
such evidence shall be admissible under this rule ... ." (emphasis added)).
223. Banker, 60 M.J. at 223.
224. Id. (quoting MIL. R. EVID. 403).
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whether the evidence is admissible.225 Once the military judge determines
the proffered evidence is admissible under M.R.E. 412, she must again
weigh the proffered evidence. 26 This second balancing, however, is done
pursuant to M.R.E. 403 to determine whether the evidence that was deemed
admissible under the factors listed in M.R.E. 403 is now inadmissible under
M.R.E. 403 itself.227 M.R.E. 403, however, requires that the probative value
of the relevant evidence be "substantiallyoutweighed by the danger of' any
of the factors listed in M.R.E. 403, such as unfair prejudice, misleading the
228
members, etc.

In Gaddis, the court stated, "M.R.E. 403 addresses prejudice to the
integrity of the trial process, not prejudice to a particular party or
witness." 229 This, technically, is how M.R.E. 412 operates. The problem with
viewing only M.R.E. 403 as a rule "address[ing] prejudice to the integrity of
the trial process,223 ° while overlooking the fact that M.R.E. 412 does the
same thing, fails to appreciate some of the reasons for which M.R.E. 412 was
enacted in the first place.23' Prior to adoption of M.R.E. 412, the defense was
often allowed to introduce "evidence of at best minimal probative value
with great potential for distraction and [which] incidentally discourage[d]32
2
both the reporting and prosecution of many sexual assaults.
Furthermore, prior to the adoption of M.R.E. 412 and its federal
counterpart, it was not unusual for the trial to turn into a case against the
victim to determine whether she was chaste.233 Such evidence corrupts "the
integrity of the trial process" because the victim is now being tried instead
of the defendant-the one actually charged with a crime.
The similar applications of the balancing tests in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) and
M.R.E. 403 are brought out to underscore the parallelism between those
balancing tests. There are two main differences, however, between these two
225. Id.
226. Id. at 223 n.3.
227. Id.
228. See MIL. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added) (including factors such as "unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the members, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.").
229. United States v. Gaddis, 70 M.J. 248, 255 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (quoting United States v.
Collier, 67 M.J. 347, 354 (C.A.A.F. 2009)). It is also worth mentioning at this point that "[n]o
other crime has its own set of evidentiary rules." Capers, supra note 4, at 832.
230. Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 255.
231. See supra Part II.
232. MIL. R. EvID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36; see discussion supra Part II.
233. Id.; see supratext accompanying note 10.
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rules.234 Those differences are the function of each rule and the party to
whom each rule applies. M.R.E. 412(c)(3), as stated earlier, is a rule of
exclusion and applies only to the accused. 23" The proponent of the
evidence-the accused-must show why evidence that is ordinarily
inadmissible should be admitted." 6 In contrast, M.R.E. 403 is a rule of
inclusion and applies to both parties to the action-the accused and the
237
government.
If the accused has already shown that the proffered evidence offered
under the "constitutionally required" exception 23 is relevant and meets the
multi-factor "material" test, the evidence should be admissible, subject only
to balancing under M.R.E. 403.239 Upon the defendant showing that the
proffered evidence is relevant and material, it should rest on the
government to show why the proffered evidence should nevertheless be
excluded. The defendant has a right to put on a defense; however, this right
is not without limits. 240 This brings us to another danger of the balancing
test in M.R.E. 412(c)(3).
The second risk found in the balancing test of M.R.E. 412(c)(3) is that it
may prevent a defendant from presenting a complete defense. The Fifth and
Sixth Amendments to the Constitution guarantee certain rights to criminal
defendants.241 These rights include the right to a fair trial,242 the right to
confront the witnesses against him, and the right to "have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor." 243 The accused, however, "is

234. United States v. Banker, 60 M.J. 216, 222 (C.A.A.F. 2004).
235. MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3); see Banker, 60 M.J. at 223.
236.

MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).

237.

MIL. R. EVID. 403; see Banker, 60 M.J. at 223.

238. MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(C) ("In a proceeding, the following evidence is admissible, if
otherwise admissible under these rules: evidence the exclusion of which would violate the
constitutional rights of the accused.").
239. See supra text accompanying note 220 for a list of the factors considered when
determining whether evidence offered under M.R.E. 412 is material.
240.

Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 252.

241. See U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury... ; nor
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law....") and U.S. CONST. amend VI ("In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . .
242. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
243. U.S. CONST.amend. VI.
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not simply allowed cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and
to whatever extent, the defense might wish .... But no evidentiary rule can
deny an accused a fair trial or all opportunities for effective crossexamination. " "
When the defendant offers evidence under M.R.E. 412(b)(1)(C), he bears
the burden of showing that the evidence is relevant, material, and
favorable. 24' The defendant must pass the "relevance" hurdle of M.R.E. 401
by showing that the evidence is relevant because it has "any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination
of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." 46 This is an admittedly low bar, but one the defendant must
clear. 47 Once shown the evidence is relevant, the defendant must then show
it is material.24" To determine "whether the [relevant] evidence is material,
the military judge looks at the importance of the issue for which the
evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in th[e] case; the extent
to which th [e] issue is in dispute; and the nature of the other evidence in the
case pertaining to th[e] issue." 249 With M.R.E. 412(c)(3) as it currently is
applied, the military judge must then determine whether the relevant and
material evidence is favorable to the defendant's case.25 0 The author
contends that once the defendant has shown that the evidence is not only
244. Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318 (emphasis added) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673,679 (1986)).

245. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222; Ellerbrock, 70 M.J. at 318-19; see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
246. MIL. R. EVID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.").
247. MIL. R. EVID. 401 only requires "any tendency." Id. As long as the evidence has "any
Id.
tendency to make the existence of any fact ... more probable or less probable .
(emphasis added).
248. F.R.E. 401(b) states, "Evidence is relevant if: the fact is of consequence in
determining the action." M.R.E. 401 "abandons any reference to 'materiality' in favor of a
single standard of'relevance.'" MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, MIL. R. EvID.
401 analysis, at A22-33 (2012). Under M.R.E. 412, instead of using the F.R.E. 401(b) standard
for materiality, the court will look at the following three factors: "the importance of the issue
for which the evidence was offered in relation to the other issues in this case; the extent to
which this issue is in dispute; and the nature of the other evidence in the case pertaining to
this issue." Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (quoting United States v. Colon-Angueira, 16 M.J. 20, 26
(C.M.A. 1983)).
249. Banker, 60 M.J. at 222 (quoting United States v. Colon-Angueira, 16 M.J. 20, 26
(C.M.A. 1983)).
250. Id.
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relevant, but also material under the military's three-part test, he has shown
that the proffered evidence is favorable to his defense.
Upon clearing the "relevant and material" hurdles, the burden should fall
to the government to show why, under M.R.E. 403, the evidence should be
excluded. The government bears the burden of proving that the defendant
is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' Since a criminal defendant is
innocent until proven guilty, and if the defendant has shown that he has
relevant and material evidence that may aid in his acquittal, the government
must be required to show that the probative value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice.252
Often, the alleged victim's prior sexual conduct is irrelevant.253 One
occasion making an alleged victim's prior sexual acts relevant and material
is when the alleged victim has a motive to lie.25 4 Again, once the defendant
shows that such evidence is relevant and material, it should remain the
government's task to show why the evidence should still be excluded under
M.R.E. 403. Instead, once a defendant shows that the evidence is relevant
and material, the defendant must further show that its probative value
outweighs any unfair prejudice in order to admit the evidence.2 5 Once the
evidence is deemed admissible, however, it is still subject to exclusion under
M.R.E. 403.256

Concern that eliminating the balancing test in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) would
cease to protect victims of sexual assault considers only a narrow view of the
rule. M.R.E. 412, the "rape shield statute," is in place to protect victims from
25 7
undue embarrassment while being cross-examined by the defendant;
however, the privacy interest of the victim is not a separate interest distinct
from the interests of the government. It must be stated that the victim is not
251.

10 U.S.C. § 851 (2014).

252. MIL. R. EVID. 403.
253. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36.

254. Josh Maggard, Note, Courting Disaster: Re-Evaluating Rape Shields in Light of
People v. Bryant, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1341, 1367 (2005) (discussing that a case in which "a

defendant's constitutional right to present a defense outweighs an accuser's privacy interest
is a case in which bias, motive to lie, or evidence of fabrication is demonstrable.").
255. MIL. R. EVID. 412(c)(3).
256. Banker, 60 M.J. at 223 n.3 ("M.R.E. 412 does not wholly supplant M.R.E. 403 since
the military judge may exclude evidence on M.R.E. 403 grounds even if that evidence would
otherwise be admissible under M.R.E. 412.").
257. MIL. R. EvID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36 ("Rule 412 is intended to shield
victims of sexual assaults from the often embarrassing and degrading cross-examination and
evidence presentations common to prosecutions of such offenses.").
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a party to the action. A criminal proceeding, whether it is a court-martial
proceeding or a civilian criminal case, is between the defendant and the
entity representing the People.25 This is not to say that, because the victim
is not a party to the action, the victim's privacy interests are not important
or that the court should ignore such privacy interests. The victim should
not be responsible for bearing the burden of protecting her interests when
she is not the one on trial. The government, however, has a vested interest
in protecting the victim's interest-mainly, to place a defendant who is
guilty of sexual assault in prison.259
Removing the balancing test in subsection (c)(3) may seem to cause a
"chilling effect" on reports of sexual assault, but such an amendment will
not harm or infringe upon the victim's privacy interest in a more substantial
way than if the test remained. M.R.E. 403, if applied properly, would
prevent such occurrences. Moreover, a victim's privacy interest does not
have greater weight than a defendant's right to a constitutionally proper
trial.26 ° Victims may feel as though the "rape shield" is not shielding them at
all should Congress remove the M.R.E. 412(c)(3) balancing test; and it may
cause victims of sexual assault to stop reporting occurrences of this crime.
In order to prevent this "chilling effect," the government must take the
responsibility to protect the victim's privacy interest at trial. Such
responsibility should not be left to an evidentiary rule.
One of the reasons for adopting Rule 412 was to prevent the defense
from putting the victim and her chastity, or lack thereof, on trial.2 1 Both the
government and the victim have an interest in preventing this from
happening. The victim's interest is self-dignity. Her sexual history does not
need to unnecessarily be on display in open court. The government's
interest, however, falls squarely under M.R.E. 403. Putting the victim and
her sexual history on trial confuses the issues-chastity is not the issue;
sexual assault is the issue. Such evidence misleads the members-the
members begin asking if her behavior indicated that she "wanted it" as
opposed to asking whether the defendant sexually assaulted the victim. In
258. Tanford & Bocchino, supra note 215, at 576 ("The victim is not the opponent, the
[government] is. The victim is only a witness.").
259. MIL. R. EVID. 412 analysis, supra note 1, at A22-36 (noting that the prior rule
"discourage[d] both the reporting and prosecution of many sexual assaults.").
260. This is a fair inference in that the defendant's rights, when it comes to criminal
trials, are explicitly enumerated in the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and U.S.
CONST. amend VI. Unfortunately, however, a victim's privacy interest is not explicit within
the body of the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. See generally U.S. CONST.
261. Seesupra Part II.
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most instances, introducing the victim's sexual history wastes time-time is
spent on determining either the veracity of her past or whether she has
questionable character traits which do not have any bearing on her
credibility. Evidence of her sexual history is also likely to cause undue
delay-the issue of her chastity becomes a trial within a trial when such
evidence does not have "any tendency to make the existence of [a] fact that
is [at issue] more . . . or less probable than it would be without the

evidence."262 The victim is not the one whose chastity must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant must show why the victim's
sexual history is relevant and material. It should then be up to the
government to show why its probative value is substantially outweighed by
unfair prejudice.
V. CONCLUSION

Protecting the privacy interests of victims of sexual assault, while of great
importance, cannot be held more important than the constitutional rights
of a defendant. Eliminating the balancing test in M.R.E. 412(c)(3) only
appears to remove some of the protections afforded victims. Protections are
still in place in rules such as M.R.E. 401 and 403, as long as the government
properly and adequately argues such rules. Arguments of "unfair prejudice"
under M.R.E. 403 should include the privacy interests of the victim. The
defendant, although he has a right to put on a defense, is limited in how he
may defend himself given other policy considerations.26 3 Amending M.R.E.
412(c)(3) to eliminate the balancing test in order for practitioners and
military judges to better understand and apply the rule does not undermine
the interests of the victim. If anything, it may keep decisions from being
reversed and remanded due to the misunderstanding and misapplication of
the rule. Such reversals would require the victim to go through the ordeal of
trial all over again. Instead, the rule should be amended to remove the
substantial risks that military judges may exclude evidence that is otherwise
admissible and that defendants would be prevented from presenting a
complete defense.
Evidence offered by the defendant under M.R.E. 412 must first fall within
one of the exceptions found in M.R.E. 412(b)(1). 21 If the evidence falls

262. MIL. R. EVID. 401.
263.

Gaddis, 70 M.J. at 252.

264. See MIL. R. EVID. 412(b)(1) (including evidence to show someone "other than the
accused [is] the source of the semen, injury, or other physical evidence"; "specific instances
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within one of the exceptions, the defendant must show that the proffered
evidence is relevant and material.265 Under the author's proposed
amendment, the evidence would be found admissible once it is shown to be
both relevant and material. At this point, instead of a balancing test under
M.R.E. 412 to further determine whether the evidence is admissible, a
balancing test under M.R.E. 403 would be conducted. It would be under this
balancing test that the government must show that the probative value of
the proffered evidence is substantially outweighed, either by unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, misleading the members, or by one of the
other factors found in M.R.E. 403. If the government succeeds in showing
that the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed, the
defendant's proffered evidence should be deemed inadmissible. The court
can still consider the victim's privacy interests since such evidence has the
potential to unfairly prejudice the members. After all, it is the defendant
who is on trial and not the victim.

of sexual behavior" with the accused to prove consent; and "evidence the exclusion of which
would violate the constitutional rights of the accused.").
265. See supra text accompanying note 220.

